Buffalo Law Review
Volume 11

Number 1

Article 82

10-1-1961

Evidence—Error to Introduce Questions Unanswered by
Defendants
Buffalo Law Review Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Buffalo Law Review Board, Evidence—Error to Introduce Questions Unanswered by Defendants, 11 Buff. L.
Rev. 217 (1961).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol11/iss1/82

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
slow down if proceeding through a red light, the jury may still consider whether
he may have assumed that the defendant would concede the right of way.
A final, and fatal error, was the refusal of the trial court to instruct the
jury that a violation of an ordinance is evidence of negligence.86 New York
is in agreement with the majority rule in that such a violation, although not
conclusive or presumptive of negligence, is nevertheless evidence of negligence.
R.A.O.
ERROR TO INTRODUCE QUESTIONS UNANSWERED BY DEFENDANTS

In People v. Bianculi,8 7 the evidence produced at the trial was sufficient to
sustain the defendants' convictions; however, a unanimous Court of Appeals
reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial because of substantial error
in admitting certain evidence. The prosecutor persistently interrogated police
officers and one of the defendants in regard to certain questions asked by police
officers to the defendants immediately after their arrest. The prosecutor also
emphasized that the defendants refused to answer any of the questions.
On appeal, the defendants' contention was that the questions could not
be admitted into evidence and did not form a foundation for an admission or a
confession. The trial judge had ruled that each of the defendants was "under no
obligation to speak [after his arrest], but whether or not he spoke may be a
circumstance that the jury may want to know."88 Conceding the truth of the
trial judge's observation, the Court of Appeals declared that such questions
followed by silence have a great impact on the minds of jurors. The jurors are
led to believe that silence is equivalent to an admission of guilt, for if the
defendants were innocent, they would have denied the charges. Such an
inference is totally inconsistent with the defendants' exercising the right to
remain silent, and the State must not be permitted to call to the attention of the
jury that the defendants refused to answer incriminatory statements after
arrest.8 9 The probative value of such evidence is clearly negligible.
The decision represents no change in New York law, as the earlier decision,
People v. Travato,90 is directly in point.
Bd.
STANDARD FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

In Woodson v. New York City Housing Authority,91 the plaintiff brought
an action for assault, false arrest and false imprisonment. The plaintiff, an
interested witness, and a disinterested observer, who corroborated the plaintiff's
testimony, testified in regard to the factual circumstances, and the defendant
rested at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case. In the charge to the jury, the
86. Major v. Waverly & 'Ogden, 7 N.Y.2d 332, 192 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1960).
87. 9 N.Y.2d 468, 215 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961).
88. Respondent's Brief, 7779 Cases & Points, Case 6, p. 24.
89. People v. Travato, 309 N.Y. 382, 131 N.E.2d 557 (1955) ; Cf. People v. Rutigliano,
261 N.Y. 103, 184 NE. 689 (1933).
90. Supra note 89.
91. 10 N.Y.2d 30, 217 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1961).

